Desc. of 1st A-B War

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The First Anglo-Burmese War
1824 - 1826
extracts from A History of Rangoon
by B.R. Pearn, published 1939

Index

View from the river, Rangoon, 1824

The Landing at Rangoon, 1824

The principal approach to the Shwedagon, 1824

View from Major Canning's residence, Rangoon, 1824

View of a lake near Rangoon, 1824

View from Captain Brown's residence, Rangoon, 1824

View of the Shwedagon Pagoda to the westward of the Great Road, 1824

..... In 1824 war broke out between Burma and the East India Company, mainly as a result of the troubles on the Arakan frontier. The Company’s government resolved upon an invasion of the Irrawaddy valley through Rangoon, among other military measures and a combined force of nearly eleven thousand men with forty pieces of artillery, drawn from the Madras and Bengal armies, under the command of Sir Archibald Campbell, was assembled at the Andamans.

On the afternoon of the 9th May the transports carrying this force, escorted by H.M.S. Liffey, H.M.S. Larne (commanded by Capt. Marryat, the novelist,) H.M.S. Sophia, the Slaney, sloop, and several Company’s cruiser, besides twenty gun brigs and about as many row-boats each armed with an eighteen-pounder gun, appeared off the mouth of the Rangoon river, one unit of the fleet was the sixty horse-power steamer Diana, the first steam vessel, so far as was known, ever to visit Rangoon.

On the morning of the 10th the fleet stood in the river and anchored within the bar but then a delay of twenty-four hours ensued, thought it is difficult to see the necessity of the, it was not till the 11th that the fleet, piloted by Capt. May Flower Crisp, who had for some years commanded a merchant vessel trading to Rangoon and with the Larne and Liffey leading, moved up the river on the morning tide.

As it passed the Mibya watch-post a two gun battery opened fire but was unable to maintain itself against the cannonade of the warships, a few other batteries were also silenced as the fleet advanced and by the early afternoon the expedition was anchored off the town.

Bengal Divn. - Col. McCreagh
H.M. 13th Regt.
H.M. 38th Regt.
40th Bengal N.I.
European Artillery

Madras Troops – Col. MacLean
1st Divn.
H.M. 41st Regt.
Madras European Regt.
1st Batt. Pioneers
3rd Madras N.I.
7th M.N.I.
8th M.N.I.
9th M.N.I.
10th M.N.I.
17th M.N.I.
22nd M.N.I.
Madras Foot Artillery
H.M. 89th Regt.
Bombay Foot Artillery
Total

-
727 ranks
1,035
86
360

-
-
762
863
552
676
695
652
658
609
617
711
560
1,012
69
10,644

The first impression which the town made on the invaders was not very pleasing. It by no means came up to the expectations which had been formed. “We had been so much accustomed to hear Rangoon spoken of as a place of great trade and commercial importance, that we could not fail to feel disappointed at it mean, poor appearance,” wrote one member of the force.

“We had talked of its Custom House, its dockyards and its harbour, until our imaginations had led us to anticipate, if not splendour at least some visible signs of a flourishing commercial city, but, however humble our expectations might have been, they must have fallen short of the miserable and desolate picture which the place presented. The Custom House, the principal buildings in the place, seemed fast tottering into ruins. One solitary hull upon the stocks marked the dockyard and a few country vessels and country canoes were the only craft found in this great commercial mart.”

Similarly another observer notes, “to eyes accustomed only to the grandeur and regularity of European cities, it naturally presented an assemblage of fragile bamboo tenements and nothing more.”

The arrival of the expedition at the river mouth had taken Rangoon by surprise. Neither Burmese nor British had expected this event. The first warning had been received by means of beacons, which had been lit at the Mibya guard-post when the fleet first appeared on the 9th evening and which could be seen from the fleet that night passing the news up the river.

At the time the European residents, some of whom complained strongly afterwards that the Company’s Government should have given them warning of an approaching attack, were nearly all “at a festive meeting” at a garden in the suburbs and they were promptly arrested and put in irons.

The Burmese official, however, quickly came to the conclusion that the town could not be held against the enemy, for the stockade was in a poor state of repair and very few troops were available. “This defence,” wrote an observer a few months before, “is now in a very dilapidated state, unfit to keep out a few drunken sailors, much less a disciplined army, excepting that part of the town facing the river. Peons or followers of members of Government, are the only persons that have the semblance of soldiers for defence and of these there are about 1,000 men without discipline and among whom perhaps 100 good muskets may be seen.”

Under these circumstances, realising the impossibility of maintaining a defence of the town, the local officials with the object of causing as much embarrassment as possible to the invading force, had, as soon as the news of the approach of the force was received, issued orders that all the inhabitants were to vacate the place and withdraw to the jungle. Such defence as was put up was intended only to delay the enemy’s landing until the town was completely deserted. Thus the fleet was net with nothing more than a few shots from the battery at the King’s Wharf.

The Liffey anchored close to the wharf, the transports in her rear and the battery, which could not be held against the Liffey’s guns, soon ceased firing. Immediately after the first shots had been exchanged, a boat came off from the shore bearing Mr Hough, of the American Baptist Mission, with a message from the Yewum threatening the instant execution of the European prisoners if the firing did not cease, but the firing nevertheless continued until the battery was silenced. Three detachments were then landed from the transports, one above the town, one below and one at the wharf and within twenty minutes of the Liffey’s arrival the town had been taken.

The same evening Maingthu was occupied with even less resistance, this step being essential as the Larne had gone aground again, this time off the Dalla shore (she had previously grounded briefly going up the Rangoon river.) The European prisoners had been kept in the Custom House and their execution was under consideration when a 32lb shot from the Liffey passed through the building, the guard withdrew taking seven of their prisoners with them and leaving the rest behind to be released by the landing party. The seven who were taken away were found next day by a patrol from the invading force, still in irons, near the Pagoda.

The official list of the prisoners found in the town:-
J. Snowball
J. Turner
William Roy
R. Wyatt
G.H. Roy (country-born)
Arratoon (Armenian)
R.J. Trill
Alexander Tench
H.W. Thompson
J. Wade (A.B.M.)
P. Aide (Greek)

The main body of the force did not land till the morning of the 12th, the town being guarded by the three detachments over night. A certain amount of looting took place during the evening, though there was a good deal of disappointment at the absence of valuables. However, plenty of tobacco was found and of less utility, bales of cotton cloth but above all, the first troops to enter the town found a store of brandy in the cellar of a merchant’s house and by nightfall the greater part of the European troops were intoxicated and went roaming the town bearing lighted torches, with the result that fires broke out.

Some of the officers then intervened and poured the rest of the spirit away and sailors from the ships were sent ashore and managed to check the flames, though not till nearly half the town had been destroyed. If the Burmese had made an attack that night, few of the troops ashore would have been in a condition to offer any show of resistance.

When the remainder of the expedition landed next day they won no booty except poultry and a certain amount of cloth. The inhabitants had removed most of their property and little was to be found beyond the ancient weapons in the government arsenal.

The invading force was distributed in the town and along the two roads leading to the Pagoda, the kyaungs around the Sule Pagoda, along the road sides and on the Pagoda platform, being used as barracks. The artillery was stationed on the Pagoda Hill which formed the key to the whole position and detachments were also posted at Pazundaung and at the Theinbyu commonly called “the White House Stockade.” Parties of seamen were sent along the river to seek out and destroy any armed boats or fire-rafts which might be met.

The deserted state of the town was highly disappointing to the invaders. “We were placed in the singular predicament of capturing a town which a day or two before had contained several thousand inhabitants, but of whom not one single individual remained on our taking possession of it.” It was considered in the army that the unnecessary delay of twenty-four hours at the river mouth was responsible for this state of affairs, if the force had ascended the river without waste of time, the whole or greater part of the population would still have been in the town, but as it was, “we found the whole town stripped and not a vestige of anything was to be found.” And not only was Rangoon deserted and swept clean of supplies, but, more serious still, the surrounding country also had been almost completely cleared of food and cattle and the river had been cleared of boats. “Deserted as we found ourselves, by the people of the country, from whom alone we could expect supplies, un-provided with the means of moving either by land or water and the rainy monsoon just setting in – no prospect remained to us but that of a long residence in the miserable and dirty hovels of  Rangoon, trusting to the transports for provisions, with such partial supplies as our foraging parties might procure from time to time, by distant and fatiguing marches into the interior of the country. In the neighbourhood of Rangoon itself, nothing beyond some paddy or rice in the husk, was found, the careful policy of the Burmese authorities had removed beyond our reach everything that was likely to be of use to an invading army.”

It had been confidently expected that, in view of the supposedly wealthy and fertile nature of the district, bountiful supplies would be available and further, it had been anticipated that the Mons would immediately rise in support of the invading force and provide boats and draught-cattle. Therefore no provision had been made for land or water transport or for supplies of food. Now it was found that the supplies, whether of food or of transport, had been removed, than which, it was justly observed, “no measure was better adapted for paralysing our efforts” and also that the Mons had not the slightest inclination to rebel.

Proclamations promising protection and urging the inhabitants to return to Rangoon were circulated among the neighbouring villages, but since most of the people of the villages had been removed along with the inhabitants of Rangoon, these had little effect. Moreover, even those Mons who were aware of the proclamations remained unimpressed, not unnaturally preferring to wait to see which side was going to be victorious before committing themselves. In consequence, here was no food and there was no transport. The district had been almost swept bare of cattle and though the neighbouring creeks were scoured for boats, hardly any could be obtained, nor if the boats had been found, were there the men to work them.

This proved disastrous for the invaders. The army found itself dependent on Bengal and Madras for supplies, but no precautions had been taken there against such an emergency and in any case it took four months for a ship sent from Rangoon to return to the port with supplies. With neither transport not food, the expedition, which, moreover, had been unwisely despatched at the beginning of the rainy season, found itself marooned in Rangoon, unable to advance, half starved and to a considerable extent, besieged by the Burmese. It was nine months before the situation had changed sufficiently to enable the force to advance into the interior.

Meanwhile the conditions which the invading force had to endure were unpleasant in the extreme. There was no bazaar and all food had to be obtained from the Commissariat, which had brought little stores of rations and what had been brought was old and bad. It would appear that in the expectation that the supplies would not in fact be called into use, a good deal of malpractice had taken place on the part of the contractors and the Commissariat Department.

Salt-beef, salt-pork and weevil biscuit, formed the daily fare, plus pineapples from the gardens and jungles, over indulgence in which produced a good deal of sickness. When “hard beef and rancid pork” began to give out, salt-fish was supplied, but was sometimes so bad as to be uneatable. The supply of bad biscuits became exhausted and had to be replaced by rice. There was no cocoa, no coffee, no sugar, no bread. “Salt meat boiled, salt meat fried, salt meat curried” were the normal diet, plus paddy-bird curry, made with dhall which the Commissariat served out. But even paddy-bird curry was difficult to obtain, for shooting game within the lines was prohibited and could be indulged in only surreptitiously and on one occasion, when after several days of foraging, some four thousand cattle had been collected, the General ordered them to be set free, as they were private property and he did not wish to alienate the Mons.

Such food as could be purchased privately was at a premium. Some of the transport Captains were in a position to sell food, but at an enormous profit. “Bullocks were very seldom to be obtained for any money, fresh provisions of every kind were almost equally scarce, so much so that a pound of mutton sometimes sold for five shillings, a duck for eighteen, a fowl for twenty, a pound of soft bread for two, butter for four, cheese for five, tea for twenty, a basket of potatoes (weighing about 130 lbs.) for twenty and a bottle of wine or spirits for ten shillings. Six months elapsed before any vegetables whatever could be procured. Animals for draught were equally inaccessible and when a few ponies were captured they fetched nearly 100 l. sterling per head. Those junior officers who could not afford to purchase such supplies were driven to the expedient of cadging meals off the Captains of the transports.

Under such conditions, together with the rains, sickness broke out inevitably. Fevers and “rheumatic ailments, acute dysentery and obstinate and wasting diarrhoea” became common and in July scurvy also afflicted the troops. Both Indian and European troops suffered equally, the former from lack of vegetables and the latter from lack of meat. By the end of July, Rangoon “ was one vast hospital, the best part of the force, including camp-followers, being under the influence of fever and it was as gloomy a scene as could well be conceived. Scurvy and dysentery were the most destructive disorders and these soon filled our hospitals to overflowing.” The total want of fresh meat, fish, milk, bread and vegetables, made it impossible to provide proper diet in the hospitals, where, in addition, there was a shortage of medicines.

From June to October the average monthly admissions to hospital from the artillery alone numbered 127 being over a quarter of the total strength and this is said to be below the average of other units, in November, of the five thousand European troops, scarcely thirteen hundred were fit for duty and in the first eleven months that the expedition was in Burma nearly half the European troops died.

In August a bake-house was established and bread became available but only in sufficient quantity to meet the needs of the sick. The transport Captains, however, sent their boats down the river to catch fish and this was some relief. The situation, disastrous though it was for the invading army, proved beneficial to the more enterprising traders, thus the shortage of beer was turned to good account by one of them who, learning of the approach of a ship with a supply, went down the river to meet it and established a “corner” in beer, purchasing nearly the whole stock at the rate of Rs.8 per dozen bottles and Rs. 90 per cask. Having brought it ashore, he sold it at Rs 1-8 a bottle and Rs. 1-4 a can, making a total profit of Rs. 10,000.

Not till towards the end of the year did the situation improve appreciably. The cessation of the rains helped to reduce the amount of sickness and better still, Chinese traders began to arrive from Penang with bread, tea, sugar, pigs, poultry, vegetables, in abundance, which they sold at a vast profit.

It is evident that the enterprise had been undertaken in an altogether too light-hearted spirit by those responsible. The greatest soldier of the time seems to have regarded the affair as trivial. When asked who should be given the command, the Duke of Wellington suggested Lord Combermere. “But we have always understood that your Grace thought Lord Combermere a fool.” “So he is a fool and a damned fool, but he can take Rangoon.” However, Sir Archibald Campbell was sent instead.

Naturally for the whole of the rains of 1824 little of a military nature could be achieved by the invaders. Apart from casualties due to sickness, their army was immobilised for lack of transport, if a gun was needed in an expedition outside the lines it had to be moved by manual labour. Under such conditions, military operations were trivial and were restricted to little more than such measures as were needed to secure the hold on the town.

The Burmese on the other hand, having been reinforced by ten thousand men sent from Upper Burma as soon as news of the invasion was received at Court were active throughout the rains, stockades sprang up “like mushrooms” in the neighbourhood, it was said, as at Kemmendine, Kamayut and Kokine, and formed a serious danger to foraging parties, while towards the end of May the Burmese forces gradually closed in on the invaders’ lines, advancing through the jungle and sometimes entrenching themselves within a few hundred yards of the Pagoda, firing on the picquets, cutting off stragglers and creeping up to the sentries at night and cutting them down. Although a formal assault towards the end of May proved abortive, these effectively harassing tactics which the Burmese army adopted had a bad effect on the morale of the invading force and in the hope of bringing about a battle in which the Burmese might be finally disposed of, a number of attacks were made on their positions.  Moreover, so little information was available about the strength of the Burmese force in the neighbourhood that the commander of the invading force hoped, by means of such expeditions, to obtain accurate intelligence.

An offer on the part of the Burmese command to treat having been rejected by General Campbell, who doubted the authority of the commander to negotiate and also suspected some ulterior motive, an advance was made from Rangoon on the 28th May towards the north and three unfinished and undefended stockades were occupied. Two guns accompanied this expedition, but the artillery men, who had to manhandle their guns, became thoroughly exhausted and had to be sent back to Rangoon under escort of about one third of the force. The remainder continued their way “through rice fields some inches under water and in a heavy fall of rain” and after “a most fatiguing match of eight or ten miles” reached Gyogon, where two more stockades had been erected.

These were taken with some loss but the Burmese defenders, pursuing tactics which were exactly suited to their circumstances, withdrew into the jungle and could not be brought to pitched battle. The expedition returned to Rangoon and the following day another force was sent out which found the stockades deserted and similarly failed to engage the Burmese. On the 30th a stockade in the jungle not far from the Shwe Dagon was taken and on the same day a detachment was sent to Syriam, but the old Portuguese Fort there “built upon an eligible and commanding height was so completely overgrown with trees and brushwood, as to be scarcely perceptible from the river,” and no Burmese force was met.

The strongest Burmese position at this time was Kemmendine, where several stockades had been erected. On the 3rd June a detachment marched westwards from the Shwe Dagon upon these stockades, while another force went by boat up the river. The river force landed and burnt the village but part of the land force, being mistaken for Burmese, was bombarded from the boats and after that could not be induced to attack and the remainder failed when it did attack. On the 10th June the attack was renewed on a bigger scale and the stockades were occupied on the 11th. Thereafter the post at Kemmendine was garrisoned by the invaders.

In the same month, June, news was received from Rangoon that the Dalla Myowun had come down with orders from the King to block up the river at the bar off Monkey Point, so as to cut the invaders’ communications with Bengal; but nothing came of this effort. It was observed at the time that “had his Majesty issued these orders previous to our arrival and his Engineers known how to set about the execution of them by blocking up the narrow channels off Monkey and Kings Point, 3 miles below the town, difficulty might have been experienced in our progress up, which must have been carried on through a jungle previously deemed impenetrable or by a circuitous navigation up the Pegue river and Pujjoondaung Creek inland to the great Pagoda and from there by land to Rangoon which, properly defended, might have given some trouble.”

During the rest of June little fighting occurred while the Burmese were gathering strength for a further assault on Rangoon. A change was made in the Burmese command, the Wungyi Thadomingyimaha and the Yamawaddy Min replacing the Wungyi Thadominkaung and Thadomahathinapati.   The new generals made their headquarters at Kamayut, from where they attempted an encircling movement, reinforced by fire-rafts which were floated down the river against the shipping, these drifted ashore before any damage was done and thereafter the naval commander anchored beams in the river to intercept any further attempts.

On the morning of the 1st July the assault began. The main body of the attacking force advanced through the jungle between the Shwe Dagon and Kemmendine while others advanced to the east of the Pagoda and yet another detachment attacked Maingthu. These attacks were repelled by the invading army but Maingthu and the hamlet of Pazundaung were both burnt. In the hope of stopping the harassing tactics which were now resumed, by driving the Burmese forces to a greater distance from the defences of Rangoon, the commander of the invading army moved a detachment up the river by boat on the 8th July and destroyed a post at Pagoda Point, where the Hlaing and Panhlaing rivers meet, while on the same day another body of troops took the stockades which had been erected at Kamayut, but only after a stout resistance by the Burmese, in which Thadomingyi lost his life.

Information being received that the Burmese were concentrating at Kyaikkalo, beyond Mingaladon, a force was sent from Rangoon on the 19th July, part advancing by land and part up the Pazundaung Creek by boat, but the land column failed to reach Kyaikkalo, while the river force, unable to effect a junction with the land column, returned to Rangoon. It had been hoped to release various of the former inhabitants of Rangoon who were said to be detained in the villages along the creek, but very few could be found.

In August the Mon thugyi of Syriam, Maung Sat, was creating difficulties for the invaders by cutting off parties which went down the river to catch fish, much needed for the hospitals. He had occupied the old fort where he had cleared the brushwood and had mounted guns. Guns had also been mounted at the Syriam Pagoda. On the 4th August a small detachment was sent from Rangoon and took both the fort and the Pagoda, but made no attempt to hold them. At about the same time some Burmans from Dalla province reported that there were many there who were anxious to return to Rangoon and would do so if a guard were sent to escort them. They stated that there were no Burmese troops in the neighbourhood. This was news which the invading force had been anxiously awaiting and on the 8th of the month a detachment went up the Dalla Creek in boats but it came upon two stockades and though these were occupied with some loss, it was obvious that the information which had occasioned the expedition was false and the force withdrew.

Meanwhile the sporadic attacks upon picquets continued and on two occasions in August small bodies of Burmese troops made attempts to rush the north entrance of the Pagoda, though without success. The Burmese continued in force, also, in the Dalla district along the Creek and at Pagoda Point, they even tried to capture three of the gun-brigs but were driven off with the loss of five boats. Fishing parties were still occasionally taken prisoner.

Towards the end of September the invading army sent out a detachment which took and destroyed a stockade at Panhlaing.

In October a second advance was made on Kyaikkalo, with disastrous results. After taking a stockade at Tadagyi, north of Tadagale, the expedition failed completely at Kyaikkalo and the retreat which ensued ended in a rout, but night falling, the Burmese were unable to follow up their victory. To restore confidence an expedition was sent against Tantabin, up the Hlaing river and the stockade there was carried on the 7th of the month and on the 11th a renewed attack on Kyaikkalo was successful.

In all these numerous operations, the efforts of the invading army had been, except in the case of Kemmendine, limited to attempts to take and destroy stockades without endeavouring to hold the ground so won. The troops then returned to Rangoon, leaving the Burmese to re-occupy their posts and so able to renew their harassing tactics without difficulty. On the other hand, the difficulties of communication during the rains no doubt made it dangerous to distribute the invading force among outlying posts scattered over a large area of country.

In November the great Burmese General, Maha Bandula, arrived in the neighbourhood of Rangoon to make an assault on the invaders’ position with fifty thousand men. (more probably 16,000.) He made his headquarters at Kyaikkalo. On the 1st December he began to invest the defending lines from Kemmendine to Pazundaung and at Maingthu beyond the river. The invaders’ army was not adequate to defend the whole front and Maingthu was therefore evacuated. Kemmendine was attacked on the 1st, but, aided by the naval force in the river, the garrison was able to repel the attack, despite the sending down of fire-rafts against the boats.

On the evening of the same day a Burmese advance on the north-east of the Pagoda was checked and the next morning a party was dislodged from a commanding position which it had taken up in front of the north entrance of the Pagoda. Firing along the whole front, unaccompanied by an advance on either side, continued for the next two or three days, while the Burmese pushed their entrenchments forward on the north and east, on the north their position was within musket shot of the Pagoda, from which it was separated only by the Scotch Tank, while on the east their trenches came close to the Theinbyu, and from Maingthu they maintained a steady cannonade on the shipping.

On the 5th the defenders sent a flotilla up the Pazundaung Creek which bombarded the Burmese on their flank, while at the same time a sally was made against their entrenchments near the Theinbyu. The Burmese here were hampered by the swampy nature of the ground, which forced them to move over restricted areas so that they could not escape the gunfire from the ships. Thus they were forced to retire and Maha Bandula then abandoned his position on the east of the town and concentrated on the north, until on the 7th the defending army made a grand advance which carried the entrenchments and forced Bandula to withdraw to stockades which he had erected at Kokine, about four miles north of the Pagoda. (possibly to Kanbe and Tamwe) On the same day Maingthu was again lost by the Burmese.

So far the town had been almost devoid of it proper inhabitants. In August there had been only two hundred of them in the place and these were nearly all employees and servants of the European merchants, gradually the pongyis had begun to come back to their kyaungs but otherwise the former inhabitants had kept at a distance.  Now, however, a number of them, including a good many deserters from the Burmese army, began to arrive and all who were unarmed were admitted. But some of these were deserters in appearance only and had been sent by their commanders for a definite purpose. “Spies, assassins and incendiaries lurked in every quarter of Rangoon” it was afterwards said and the effect of their presence was shown on the night of the 14th December when fires broke out in several parts of the town.

On the 15th the Burmese army was driven from its stronghold at Kokine (another suggestion is that it was a bamboo fort at Tamwe, or possibly even Kanbe,) and that was the end of the fighting around Rangoon except that in February a stockade was destroyed at Tantabin. The Burmese army retreated northwards and left the Delta to the invaders.
As a consequence of this victory, the Mons were now willing to procure and man boats for the transport of troops and supplies, moreover, encouraged by a further proclamation by General Campbell, the Mons throughout the Delta rose in revolt and those who were with the Burmese army in many cases deserted, supported in their withdrawal by a detachment sent from the invading army in Rangoon. It thus became possible for the invaders to advance into the interior and when the necessary transport had been obtained, the army left Rangoon on its advance northwards on the 11th February 1825.

The disaster to the Burmese army involved in the repulse of the grand attack on Rangoon, the defeat at Kokine and the consequent retreat, completely altered the character of the war. If the Burmese had adhered to their former Fabian tactics, instead of engaging in pitched battle which brought defeat and rout, it is possible that the invaders would have remained immobilised in Rangoon, but the retreat opened the way northwards to the invaders and also enabled them to secure transport from the people of the Delta, failing which circumstances they could not have advanced. It would appear that the appointment of Bandula, with his energetic policy, to the command of the army at Rangoon, was a major misfortune for the Burmese Government. (Burmese opinion seems to have come to this conclusion: King Tharrawaddy, successor of King Bagyidaw, later declared that “had Bundoolah followed his advice, which was to take to the jungles and carry on a guerrilla warfare instead of meeting in force, the result of the war would have been very different.”

The war moved northward, leaving Rangoon to be simply the base for supply and when it was realised that the Burmese army was definitely retreating, still more of the former inhabitants returned to their homes in Rangoon. Land was allotted in Tatgale and Pazundaung to any who had none already and soon the population of the town was comparatively large, though not, it would seem, as much as in the days before the war.

The returned inhabitants were in general in a miserable condition, after a rains in the jungle, where many unfortunates had died and most had been sick and nearly starved and they now found, in many cases, that their homes had been destroyed. But they set to work to rebuild their homes and to resume their normal life. In a few days after the battle at Kokine a bazaar began, at first selling only fish, but later on venison, fowl and vegetables as well, and ultimately there were two bazaars in the town. But it was some months yet before there was a sufficient supply of food.

Cattle for slaughter could be obtained, but owing to the interference of the war with cultivation, the shortage of vegetables continued. Rice, too, not having been sufficiently cultivated during the preceding rains, “had risen to such an enormous price as to render it a luxury attainable only to the wealthy, while the poor of the surrounding country were driven to wild roots and the leaves of trees for the means of supporting life.” Grain was brought from India and distributed through the Delta creeks in barges under guard, but even so it was not till the crop of the autumn of 1825 came in that serious want ceased.

The Delta having been occupied, the problem of governing it arose. The expedition had been accompanied to Rangoon in the first place by a Political Commissioner in the person of Major Canning, but he, like many others, had been taken sick and in August 1824 had returned to Bengal where he died soon afterwards.  He was replaced in 1825 by T.C. Robertson of the Bengal Service, who was the junior member of a commission of two, the other member being Sir Archibald Campbell with R.D. Mangles of the Bengal Civil Service as secretary. In political matters the military member had the casting vote, but in civil matter Robertson had control though the military member could record his dissent. The secretary’s duty was “to conduct the correspondence and methodize the proceedings of the commission, so as to have all prepared for the regular administration of whatever extent of territory the chances of war might throw into our hands.”

After the arrival of Robertson the commission proceeded to organise the government of the Delta. Military officers were posted as Magistrates at Prome, Tharrawa, Bassein, Pegu, Martaban and Ye, as well as Rangoon which had had a military governor from the first occupation. Now Major Nicholson of the Bengal Army was appointed as Magistrate of Rangoon in subordination to Brigadier Smelt who commanded the garrison.

The new Magistrates, however, had to work through the thugyis and could do little more than endeavour to induce them to maintain some semblance of law and order. The thugyis were given only limited powers of imprisonment and the proceedings in serious cases were required to be sent to the Magistrate. But the system of law and order was not in reality maintained. The inhabitants of the Delta were suffering severely from want and in many cases were driven to violent crime to obtain the merest necessities of life, their accustomed system of government had broken down completely and it as far from easy to restore it, so that “there was general anarchy in Pegu, crime went undetected or if detected, unpunished. Murder and gang robbery were of every day occurrence.”

Even in the suburbs of Rangoon, despite the presence of the garrison, violent crime occurred. One morning two officers were approached by a man with his face cut in two, he was a servant to a Burman who acted as contractor to the commissariat department and through his hands considerable sums of money passed. “ A party of armed ruffians, expecting a rich booty, had broken the evening before into his dwelling, which was situated on the outskirts of the town, murdered him and his wife whilst they were asleep, ransacked his house and inflicted this dreadful wound on his servant, who was endeavouring to make his escape. No trace of the murderers could be discovered.”

So as far as Rangoon was concerned, it had, however, from the first been possible for the invaders to exercise some degree of control.  It was even possible to take a census of the inhabitants, which showed that there were in August, 1826, 1,570 houses and 8,666 people. Records were made of the amounts frequently received in export and import duties and an attempt was made to establish a regular system for the collection of custom dues.

As early as the 2nd June 1824 a proclamation had been issued in the names of Brigadier-General Archibald Campbell, Major J. Canning who was Political Officer and Capt. I. Nichol, stating that “We the undersigned Commissioners on the part of the Supreme British Authority in India, do hereby give notice to the Commanders and Officers of all vessels now in and hereafter resorting to the Rangoon river and to all persons engaged in trade at Rangoon, that, from henceforth they are prohibited from landing goods and stores of any description at all places along the banks of the river, with the exception of the Custom House Wharf, at which place all goods and stores are directed to be landed for the purpose of being examined and passed agreeably to the Custom House regulation hereto annexed and we further give notice that if any goods are landed or attempted to be landed in future contrary to the directions now given they will be liable to confiscation. Capt. I. Nichol is appointed Collector of Customs at Rangoon.”

The regulations annexed to the proclamation prescribed that all government stores, all mess-stores belonging to officers of the army and all provisions, should be duty free. Spirits were to pay a duty of Rs. 4 per gallon, wine in casks Rs. 1 per gallon and wine in bottles Rs. 2 per gallon, timber exported was to pay an ad valorem duty of 2 per cent and all other articles, whether imported or exported, were to pay an ad valorem of 8 per cent.

It is possible that the establishment of a customs system is indicative of General Campbell’s desire for the permanent establishment of British rule in the Delta and perhaps equally indicative of the reluctance of the Government of India to accede to this desire is its dis-allowance of the imposition of duties. However, although duties ceased to be collected, the two commissioners prohibited the importation of all kinds of spirits without express permission.

To facilitate navigation, a pilot brig was stationed off the mouth of the river and for the better control of shipping Capt. Hornblow, Madras Agent for Transport, was appointed Master Attendant of the port.

The war was ended by the Treaty of Yandabo,which was concluded on the 24th February 1826 and among the terms of peace was a provision that an indemnity of one crore of rupees should be paid to the Company, on receipt of one quarter of which the invading army would withdraw to Rangoon, which it was to continue to occupy until the second quarter had been paid.

The second quarter was not paid until the 8th December 1826 and thus Rangoon remained in enemy occupation until the 9th December. One other provision of the Treaty affected Rangoon, viz. that British vessels need not in future un-ship their guns and rudders when they entered the port, a longstanding grievance being thus removed.

The invading force having en-shipped on the 9th December. Lt. Rawlinson was left behind to receive the remaining instalments of the indemnity and to protect commerce. He was however, merely an agent of the Company’s Government and had no administrative power, the administration of Rangoon reverted to the Burmese Government.

The handing over of the town was not unattended with difficulties. The new Myowun, who had been received at Kemmendine by General Campbell on the 24th November, had wanted to enter the town with six hundred men before the Company’s troops left and to share the control of the town with the British administrator, but this suggestion was firmly refused. After that, it was found the Burmese in the town had been collecting arms and a house to house search was made, while troops patrolled the streets and the weapons were discovered. There were many prisoners in the gaol, men who had been convicted of crime by the Magistrate and the Wungyi suggested that all should be released when the garrison departed, but the officer in charge, Gouger, a former merchant who had been given command of the police, refused to undertake the responsibility of releasing a large number of “ferocious characters” and left it to the Myowun to do this when he assumed control.

On the prescribed day the Myowun was received in state in Rangoon by the army of occupation with a salute of nineteen guns, and, the troops having embarked, the Burmese flag, nine by six cubits, red in colour with a peacock in the centre and a yellow circle around, was hoisted on the flagstaff at the Wharf. A salute of three guns accompanied the hoisting of the flag and the day was celebrated by pwes.

The departure of the Company’s troops was the signal for a Mon insurrection against the restored Burmese authorities. The Mons, imagining that the Delta would be placed permanently under the Government of the Company, had rendered aid to the invading force and were greatly disappointed at the news of the approaching withdrawal of the garrison.

It was true that the Treaty of Yandabo provided for a general amnesty for all who had taken part in the war but such a provision was not likely to be regarded once the garrison had left, (According to Gouger, Burmese Officials were inflicting severe penalties on the Mons even before the evacuation by the garrison, but the episode which he describes does not appear to be mentioned in any other record of the period.  It may further be noted that Gouger was writing nearly forty years after the events he mentions,) and there was a good deal of feeling among both Mons and English that the Government of India, in concluding the Treaty of Yandabo which placed the Mons at the mercy of those against whom they had fought, had been guilty of an act of betrayal, especially as protection had been explicitly promised them.

Sir Archibald Campbell in a proclamation issued soon after the Burmese retreat from Rangoon in December 1824 had urged the Mons to place themselves “under the protection of the British flag... Choose from amongst yourselves a chief and I will acknowledge him.” - (1st July 1825 a letter from Capt. Maxton, Commanding at Pegu states “34 heads of villages have within the last 2 days come in... Preparations are being made to rebuild their habitations and under the assurance of the protection of the British Government, which I have held out to them, I trust that the population in general will be induced to follow their example.) (13th January 1826 a letter from Lt.-Col. Smelt states that a number of petitions from the Mons seeking a continuance of British protection were coming in.)

This proclamation had quite properly been construed as a guarantee of the restoration of Mon independence under the Company’s protection and the assistance which the Mons rendered to the invading force must have been evoked largely by that consideration. It was said that Campbell had indeed hoped to establish a Mon kingdom once more, but that his Government did not send its assent to the proposal until after the terms of peace had already been agreed at Yandabo. The only saving feature of the situation was that the occupation of Rangoon and the neighbourhood pending the payment of the second instalment of the indemnity gave the Mons an opportunity of withdrawing to Arakan or Tenasserim, which were surrendered to the Company by the treaty, but many had not the means for flight and many naturally were reluctant to leave their homes.

It should at the same time be observed that in the opinion of Robertson, the Political Commissioner, no obligation at all had been incurred towards the Mons. In so far as assistance was received from them it was paid for in cash and should be regarded as a commercial arrangement, he considered, in general in his opinion, the lower classes had little to fear from the Burmese since the money they had thus earned would enable them to pay their way out of any trouble and so far as the upper classes were concerned, they were at all times prepared to support the winning side and were as willing to oppose as to aid the invaders, such popularity as the invaders had among the Mons was due to liberal payments for assistance and to the absence of taxation and that popularity would not, be held, “survive the change that must ensue when revenue came to be sought for” in the event of annexation.

As soon as the army of occupation left Rangoon, the Myowun released the criminals from the gaol and formed them into a “corps of Braves” whose services were used against the Mons. (Gouger) But the prospect of retribution had already induced the Mons to consider rebellion and rumours of a threatened rising had reached the Court some time earlier, even in July there had been talk of it. As soon as he took charge of Rangoon, the Myowun therefore made enquiries and found that Syriam was the centre of discontent, the thugyi, Maung Sat, who had formerly fought against the English, having now set himself up as a rebel leader.

On the 15th December fighting actually began when Maung Sat’s men made an attack on the Burmese troops at Pazundaung and at the Botataung Pagoda. The situation appeared to favour the rebels and there was a panic in Rangoon which was only allayed when part of the new garrison was brought down from the Shwe Dagon.

An urgent message asking for aid was despatched to the Court and meanwhile on the 17th of the month, fifteen hundred men were sent against Syriam, but this attempt failed and the Mons were then able to besiege Rangoon, digging trenches around it and attacking the suburbs. Maung Sat was joined by the Karens of the Dalla district with whose aid he cut the communications between Rangoon and the Capital by occupying Panhlaing.  The Mons completely destroyed what was left of Kemmendine but “a much more extensive desolation presented itself in the vicinity of the town, the large suburb lying between the stockade and the river and the still larger one of Tacklay, were in ruins, such of the inhabitants as had not fled to our settlements, or taken refuge in the forests, and great numbers had done so, were cooped up within the stockade. The town seemed to be completely beleaguered by the Talains, who were n full occupation of Dalla, the Pegu flag was flying on one side of the river and the Burman on the other. The only part out of the stockade which the Burmans still retained was the Great Pagoda,” narrates an eye-witness.

For the time being the Myowun had no option but to endure a siege, he dared not face the rebels in pitched battle for defeat would involve the certain loss of Rangoon. His efforts were in consequence, despite the urging of some of his officers, restricted to minor sorties which should keep the enemy at a respectful distance from the town.  There was a certain amount of fighting in the suburbs, therefore, but not, it would seem, of a very stern character. An observer states “This day had been decided on by the Burmans, as a fortunate one, for making a sortie... The Burmans came unawares upon their enemy, on the eastern (western?) or Tacklay side of the stockade. The Talains, who were cooking or sleeping, fled precipitately and without offering any resistance, to their boats, which were soon seen crossing the river in number and in great haste, although not pursued. The Burman attack in the direction of the pagoda was not so fortunate, here they were repulsed and suffered some loss. The total killed, wounded and prisoners, was, after all, very trifling on both sides....The Burmans admitted their own loss in wounded to be fourteen.”

There were only some four hundred troops in Rangoon but they were in difficulties for want of food and seemed likely to be starved out. Fuel also was scarce. According to Burmese accounts, five thousand baskets of rice were purchased from the English to meet the needs of the garrison and from their circumstance it would seem that the Mons has been unable to blockade the river. Despite the precarious nature of their position, the Burmese took vengeance on such Mon prisoners as they could take, some with their wives and children being burnt alive. Some Chinese who lived in Tatgale were also unfortunate, they had not withdrawn to the stockade when the siege began, and this was regarded as a suspicious circumstance so that when they were captured in a sortie they were sold as slaves to the highest bidder.

The rebellion was soon crushed, however. Troops came down from Upper Burma and managed to enter the town. On the 3rd February the Mons were driven from the Theinbyu and Botataung Pagoda and were forced to withdraw to Syriam. They were too demoralised to make a further stand and when on the 21st February the Burmese crossed the Pegu river to attack the town, the Mons fled without waiting for an assault. Maung Sat fled to Tenasserim, whither some ten thousand of the Mons followed him. He was granted a pension of Rs 250 per month by the Company and died in Tenasserim on the 9th October 1830.

The war and the subsequent rebellion did much damage to Rangoon. Ordinary commerce was suspended and the ship-building industry likewise ceased for the time being. Moreover, much property was destroyed in the various fires which took place in the town and the suburbs suffered equally, those houses that were not destroyed by the Mon rebels in December 1826 being burnt by the Burmese to provide a field of fire outside the stockade.  The American missionary, Judson, states that “the place as invested by the Peguans, who had raised the standard of rebellion and taken possession of several towns in the lower part of the country. From one of the highest roofs within the stockade I obtained a view of the mission house, which afforded us shelter so many years. It is now quite in ruins, nothing remains but the posts and part of the roof. All the houses in the suburbs and by the riverside are completely swept away.”

The three Roman Catholic churches, like the Mission House, all suffered destruction. Another eye-witness refers to destruction of a different order, he had been accustomed, he says, to bathe in a small lake, probably one of the Kandawgale tanks, which, “was well concealed from public view by magnificent trees and brushwood and strange to say, was so little frequented that I was rarely disturbed by an intruder. How I was grieved, when I repeated my visit after the war, to see its dilapidated banks, its luxuriant trees cut down and its clear sparkling water converted into a filthy slimy pool! It seemed to have been the common washing-pot for the whole British army.

More serious damage yet had also been done, for the numerous Pagodas in and around the town had been pillaged. By chance, it is said, a soldier found out that within the solid stupas were small gold or silver images of Buddha, they were not in reality of precious metal, but were of plaster gilt or silvered and worth only a few shillings. Once this was discovered there was a general attack on the Pagodas till scarcely one remained un-looted. A single company which was stationed on the Shwe Dagon Pagoda platform obtained in one night a large number of such gold and silver images which they sold to an office for Rs. 300, he in his turn sending them to Calcutta where he realised a good profit. “All the smaller temples about Rangoon (of which there are several thousand) have been picked by the Europeans for the sake of the small silver Gaudmas,” notes an eye-witness. “It was truly melancholy to observe the ravages which had been committed on smaller Pagodas surrounding the Shoe Dagoon, one alone, amongst thousands, was preserved from the pillage.”

The command took no steps to prevent or put an end to this practice, indeed far from that, participated in and encouraged it, for General Campbell had “an attack made on the bowels of the Shwe Dagon, which was continued till every hope of finding the long expected treasure was vanished.”

Bodawpaya’s great bell, moreover, was seized as prize of war, but when the Prize Agents tried to transport it to Calcutta they were unsuccessful. The bell was taken down to the river and with much labour and difficulty was embarked on a raft to be floated out to a ship, but the raft heeled over and the bell sank to the bottom of the river.
It was abandoned by the Prize Agents, but in January 1826 it was recovered in a simple enough manner, two ropes were fastened to it and these were attached to a ship which was moored over the bell at low water, as the tide came up, the ship rose and lifted the bell with it. The bell was then hauled shore by the inhabitants of Rangoon and taken to the Pagoda.....

A permanent relic was left in the form of a stone obelisque erected in memory of
Major T. Walker, Madras Army, who was killed on the 5th December 1824.
This memorial stands by the wall of the R.C. Church in 31st Street.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

ABL note: in May 2014 the stone was found at
St John's R.C. Church, 368 Bo Sun Pet Street, Pabedan Township, Yangon

The repainting over the years has left its mark as the following shows,
but otherwise it is in excellent condition, we have advised on the correct spelling for the future:

In Memory of
Major J. Walker
Madras Army
Killed on the
5th of December 1824.
In Leadino a Oolumn
in the storm of the
Burmese Intrenohments
Near Ranooon
---------
Aoed 42 years